The Experiment That did not Fail: Image and Reality in the Israeli Kibbutz by Bowes, Alison
Int. J. Middle East Stud. 22 (1990), 85-104. Printed in the United States of America
Alison M. Bowes
THE EXPERIMENT THAT DID NOT FAIL:
IMAGE AND REALITY IN
THE ISRAELI KIBBUTZ
The kibbutzim of Israel show the world that communal living can be successful,
and many observers have asked the questions: Can this success be repeated
elsewhere? What are its lessons for other societies? In sociology, the validity and
importance of comparative study and the intrinsic interest of the kibbutz way of
life cannot be denied. This article questions the use of the kibbutz movement as a
social scientific laboratory, arguing that commentators risk disguising the par-
ticular problems the movement has faced, the strategies it has employed to
overcome them, and the role it has played in the development of Israeli society.
The interaction between the movement and the wider society has had far-
reaching consequences for both the kibbutzim and Israel, and these must be
clearly understood before possibly rash conclusions are drawn. Comparative
studies of kibbutzim, like all comparative studies, must be open to serious
question unless the broader context of Yishuv and Israeli society is taken into
consideration.
The discussion opens with a review of some of the literature that treats the
kibbutz as a laboratory. A historical overview shows the inextricable relationship
between the kibbutz movement and all spheres of Israeli society—economic,
political, ideological, military, and defensive. I will discuss some examples of
how the kibbutz-environment interaction can be shown to have had specific,
demonstrable effects. The first example is the effect on national planning, which
indicates some of the ways the kibbutz movement has influenced Israeli society
in general. The other three examples are more specific, relating to features of the
kibbutz of the mid-1970s, when I carried out anthropological field work. They
show the results on the kibbutzim themselves of the interactive kibbutz-
environment relationship. These are particularly clear in the kibbutz economies
and penetrate, I will suggest, most areas of kibbutz life. In conclusion, I will
argue that the lessons of the kibbutz as a comparative case are indeed important,
but that they are not direct.
THE EXPERIMENT
Martin Buber's (1949) well-known phrase extolling the kibbutz as an "experi-
ment that did not fail," a successful commune, and a model for communalists
© 1990 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/90 $5.00 + .00
86 Alison M. Bowes
everywhere was echoed by many of his contemporaries (Infield, 1946; Landshut,
1944). He wrote during the heyday of the kibbutz movement: a greater propor-
tion of the Jewish population in Palestine/Israel (Shur, 1972) were involved with
the movement than ever before, or ever since—some from the highest political
and military levels in the foundation of the new state (Arian, 1968)—and the
economy was entering a boom period (Kanovsky, 1966). Since then, many
outsiders have looked to the kibbutz as a model for cooperativism (Geertz,
1964). Benn (1964) recommended the kibbutz as an example of the successful
practice of socialism for the Third World; Rodinson (1973, p. 83) admits, if
grudgingly, that kibbutzim are "perhaps the most advanced example ever seen of
the virtues that can be developed by a communitarian life style inspired by
humanist ideology."
Kanovsky (1966) describes the very practical interest in the kibbutz shown by
Burma, Ghana, and West African Francophone countries, whose officials inves-
tigated it as a potential means of cooperativization at home. Veysey (1978) notes
the inspirational role of the kibbutz in 20th-century communal experimentation
in the United States. Bergmann (1980, p. 228) notes that collectives in Japan and
Italy have "taken the kibbutz as an example," and argues that real socialism is to
be found in the kibbutz, in contrast to the so-called socialist states.
In sociology, the kibbutz is used for various ends. Frank (1968) evaluates the
kibbutz for its applicability in the process of development in African countries,
concluding that in most cases it is inappropriate because of the degree of
ideological commitment involved. Barkin and Bennett's (1972, p. 457) lengthy
and detailed comparison between the Hutterite colony and the kibbutz is used to
suggest "a frame of reference for the analysis of the efforts of these communal
societies to balance internal and external forces." Van den Berghe and Peter
(1988, p. 524) compare kibbutzim and Hutterite colonies as well, arguing that,
although there are many differences between them, both have succeeded because
they "pragmatically modified their ideology to accommodate an irrepressible
individualism and familism," thus uncovering the secret of communalistic success.
Abrams and McCulloch (1976, p. 209), despite arguing that the kibbutz ex-
perience is of only "indirect relevance," repeatedly refer to internal characteristics
of kibbutzim to illuminate features of British communes. Aziz (1978) uses the
kibbutz as a key comparative case in his assessment of the lessons offered by
Chinese communes.
The kibbutz has also been used as a testing ground for a number of socio-
logical theories, such as questioning the universality of the family (Spiro, 1954)
and examining the universality of gender roles (Tiger and Shepher, 1975). The
kibbutz is also said to offer lessons for other societies in solving various social
problems. Wershow (1973), for example, suggests that the lack of formal retire-
ment in the kibbutz means that aged people do not suffer the alienation and
isolation they do in Western industrial society when identity-giving work is taken
away. Macarov (1975) argues that motivation to work in the kibbutz derives
from commitment rather than high wages and suggests that this principle could
be applied elsewhere to raise productivity. Leviatan (1978) concludes that rota-
tion of managerial office in kibbutzim is more efficient than long-term occupancy
because it keeps people alert, creative, and involved in their work.
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Leviatan (1984) offers a systematic treatment of what he sees as the potential
of the kibbutz for cross-cultural research, listing topics whose investigation in
the kibbutz will help further sociological theory and solve social problems in
other industrial societies. The theoretical topics are role theory, the sociology of
work, the sociology of aging, demography, achievement motivation, social inter-
actionism, and systems theory. The substantive topics are gender roles, the
effects of nonretirement on old people, longitudinal studies, collection of accurate
data on individuals, holistic studies, informal social control, and "intervention-
oriented research" involving experiments. For Leviatan, the kibbutz is apparently
a laboratory for the social researcher in which almost any topic can be investi-
gated under reasonably controlled conditions. Although, at the end of his dis-
cussion, he outlines some potential difficulties in using the kibbutz in this way, he
believes they can be overcome: aspects of kibbutz life can be treated as indepen-
dent of kibbutz organization as a whole; the small size of kibbutzim need not bar
comparison with wide-scale social structure; and the Israeli component of kib-
butz culture can be controlled for by including a sample of non-kibbutznik
Israelis in any research study.
Certainly, not all the sociologists mentioned here would agree with Leviatan's
suggestions; in particular, Abrams and McCulloch (1976) and Barkin and Bennett
(1972) offer a number of provisos, especially concerning the relationship between
the kibbutz and the wider society. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is a strong
tendency in several areas of sociological investigation towards viewing the kibbutz
as a laboratory, as Leviatan has outlined.
The kibbutz movement's own ideological structure helps explain why it has
been inspirational for communards and sociologists alike, why both groups have
sought in the movement the solutions to different problems. Van Teeffelen (1977;
cf. Rosenfeld, 1958) suggests that research in the kibbutz contains an ideological
trap: kibbutzim present themselves as successful social experiments, and demand
commitment to a socialist ideology from their members; a researcher on a
kibbutz is forced by the very intensity of interaction there, by the vigorous
scrutiny of the people s/he researches, into identifying with the kibbutz as a
community. Two particular aspects of this are important: first, the researcher
finds great difficulty, van Teeffelen (1977) suggests, in showing negative aspects
of kibbutz life. The profuse apologies Evens (1975, 1980) makes for his analysis
of a dispute confirm this suggestion. Second, there is a tendency to focus on the
kibbutz as a self-determined, dynamic community that carries on its own way of
life independently of, and sometimes in opposition to, Israeli life, customs, and
social structure. I have fallen into this trap myself, particularly in my thesis
(Bowes, 1977), though I have recently attempted an escape by reworking some
earlier material (Bowes 1978, 1986).
It is also important to note the kibbutz movement's own involvement in social
research: a kibbutz member told me in 1976 that "sociologists are the new
ideologists of the kibbutz movement," referring to the great amount of material
being produced by research institutes attached to the federations of kibbutzim at
that time. The topics chosen for investigation and the kinds of solutions offered
to minor difficulties reflected the concerns of powerful individuals within the
kibbutz movement. My informant suggested that the researchers themselves were
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part of this power structure, and that just as the kibbutz movement itself aimed
to influence the wider society towards socialism, the movement-based research
offered the kibbutz as a generally positive example of socialism in practice.
While we may not want to adopt this view wholesale, we have to recognize a
tendency for movement-based research to continue a commitment to kibbutz
ideology and make the kibbutz an example to the outside world. It is a mark of
one of the successes of the kibbutz movement that outside commentators re-
peatedly use it for inspiration, comparison, or lessons, often without fully ques-
tioning the validity of their enterprises.
KIBBUTZ AND YISHUV: FOUNDATIONS OF INTERACTION
Modern Zionist migration to Palestine began in the 1880s, and after some early,
short-lived experiments at communal living, Degania, the first kibbutz, was
founded in 1910. Settlers who became involved in attempts at communal living
were young, in their late teens and early twenties, and mostly male (Maimon,
1962). All were Zionists, some were socialists and many had been involved in
Jewish scout groups in Europe (Spiro, 1970). However, despite a clear conviction
that they must go to Palestine and participate in the Jewish settlement of the
Homeland, and despite an inclination towards socialism, they actually had very
little idea of what Palestine was like or how they were going to live when they
arrived (Viteles, 1967).
The organization of Degania, and the other early kibbutzim that followed it,
evolved through a series of responses to practical and ideological difficulties. As
problems arose, they were"endlessly discussed (Amitai, 1966; Baratz, 1954), and
the types of solutions reached, while generally socialist and generally Zionist,
could not have been predicted in detail. The rather diffuse socialism and Zionism
and ad hoc approach to problem solving are explained by the absence of a
clearly defined and articulated plan for living. Ben-David (1964, p. 47) refers to
"an almost pure process of trial and error," which was to remain the hallmark of
the kibbutz movement until 1948.
The early years of the movement's development show the settlers responding
to circumstances as they met them, without clearly defined practical plans or
established principles. Inevitably, they were to be influenced by developments
elsewhere in the Yishuv. As time went on, they began to respond in ways
advantageous to themselves and to influence the course of Zionism and, in the
end, the nature of the Israeli state.
During the British Mandate (1919-1948), the kibbutz movement became part
of the Zionist establishment in Palestine. In numbers, kibbutzim grew more
rapidly than any other type of Jewish settlement, although they continued to
represent a small percentage of the total Jewish population (Ben-David, 1964).
They acquired great ideological and political importance, became the strongest
sector of the rural economy, and developed a critical role in defending Jewish
settlement.
As kibbutz settlement continued, there was ideological and organizational
consolidation that included the development of formal links between the settlers
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in Palestine and the youth movements in Europe to prepare new settlers practi-
cally and ideologically for the process of settlement. This development was
reinforced by the crystallization of a more explicit set of moral postulates (Spiro,
1970), which included an analysis of the position of the Jews in Europe. The
latter was formulated by Ber Borochov (1948), who emphasized the lack of a
European Jewish proletarian base, argued for a separate Jewish socialist revolu-
tion in Palestine, and stressed the importance of manual work and the dignity of
labor that had first been articulated by A. D. Gordon, one of the pioneers of
Degania. For the settlers in Palestine, learning manual labor was the first step in
the Jewish revolution and the renaissance of the Jews as a nation founded on
socialism. They were not founding a kibbutz as an end in itself, but even at this
early period looked outwards, aiming to influence all Jewish settlement in
Palestine (Near, 1986). The kibbutz federations founded in the late 1920s facili-
tated communication between settlements in Palestine, and between the settlers
and the world-wide Zionist movement.
The developing ideological and organizational strength of the kibbutz move-
ment during the Mandate was not simply a result of its inherent qualities. The
kibbutzim were as dependent on the Jewish National Fund (for access to land),
the Zionist movement as a whole (for manpower), the Mandate authorities (both
for land and as a target for resistance) as they were on their own resources
(mainly manpower and ideas). But the kibbutz movement could respond to
circumstances as they occurred in ways that would be advantageous to its own
development. These responses proved increasingly beneficial to the Zionist en-
deavor and increasingly antipathetic to the Mandate government and the Arab
nationalists—which were both less and less inclined to support Zionism, as the
former began to lose control of Palestine, and the latter began to press their own
claims to the country.
With worsening relations between Jews, Arabs, and Mandate authorities, the
movement was able to enhance its position in the Yishuv by defensive operations.
Since a commune was more easily mobilized for defense than a cooperative
(moshav) with its family farms (Kanovsky, 1966), the settlement authorities saw
kibbutz settlement as more appropriate for areas thought to be hostile to settlers.
Kibbutzim also developed their own method for placing prefabricated settle-
ments—the tower and stockade (choma vemigdal)—overnight in hostile regions.
In the last years of the Mandate, the kibbutzim provided important bases and
sources of recruitment for the Jewish underground, particularly the Palmach and
the Haganah (Drabkin, 1962). Kibbutz defensive abilities were further proven in
the War of Independence, when many communities successfully held out against
the advancing Arab armies (e.g., Kibbutz Yad Mordechai; Larkin, 1971).
Ideological and organizational consolidation and military success rested on a
strong economic base, probably the key feature in the overall success of the
kibbutzim. Early settlements were predominantly agricultural: the return to the
soil was to be the agent for the rebirth of the Jewish people. Pioneering Zionism,
the dominant ideology of the period, placed great value on rural settlement
(Cohen, 1970), which helped maintain kibbutz ascendancy. Agriculture was
generally viewed as progressive. In the kibbutzim, great stress was laid on
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mechanization and intensification of production and on the diversification of the
economy (Cohen, 1966). Kibbutz agriculture advanced rapidly in the late Man-
date period and quickly became the most efficient organization in the country
(Cohen, 1966, p. 8). Kibbutzim chose the crops that were best suited to the
communal social organization they were evolving and that would enable them to
raise their standards of living quickly. They could develop to suit themselves,
virtually without competition, thereby laying firm foundations for their success
after 1948.
The Zionist authorities looked on kibbutz agriculture with favor in the 1930s
and 1940s: as a form of settlement, the kibbutz had several particular attractions.
First, setting up a kibbutz required less capital investment than setting up a
moshav (Kanovsky, 1966). Second, since less and less land was available for
Jewish settlement and the J.N.F. (and the Zionist movement generally) wanted
to be sure that the land would be successfully farmed, the kibbutzim with their
progressive agricultural orientations and their trained work force were partic-
ularly attractive. Such practical considerations helped reinforce the dominance
of pioneering Zionism, which matched the developing kibbutz-movement ide-
ology.
THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL
With the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948, the situation changed radically
for the kibbutzim. Sources of recruitment dried up virtually overnight; the
kibbutzim became isolated from new immigrants; a new state bureaucracy took
over from the old Zionist establishment and the Mandate; the military situation
altered completely; and there were far reaching political and economic changes.
Despite all this, however, the kibbutzim became part of the state establishment
by consolidating and building on their position in the Yishuv.
European Jewry, including the youth movements which were the main recruit-
ing ground of the kibbutzim, had been decimated during the Second World War,
and the early years of the state saw a massive influx of immigrants from North
Africa and Arabia (Eisenstadt, 1967). From the point of view of the kibbutz
movement, these people were quite unsuitable recruits, lacking socialist ideas,
modern Zionist commitments, and aspirations for rural life and proletarian
rebirth. Those immigrants who were allocated to rural settlements by the settle-
ment authorities were placed instead in moshavim (Baldwin, 1972, gives a full
discussion). Some kibbutzim participated indirectly in the process of immigrant
settlement by employing these new moshavniks until they were ready to start
farming their moshav plots (Shatil, 1966), although other kibbutzim refused on
principle to take on any hired labor, even to assist new immigrants (Kanovsky,
1966). Another means of involvement lay in participation in the new state
administration: between 1948 and 1953, one-eighth of the veteran members left
the kibbutzim to take up government jobs, thus becoming immediately involved
in the processes of immigrant settlement and absorption (Kanovsky, 1966). So
even though the kibbutzim lost members in this period, kibbutzniks were par-
ticipating at the highest level in directing the new state and were to exercise
considerable influence.
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In defense, the role of the kibbutz underwent considerable change. After 1948,
the army was run by the state, and underground military activity based in
kibbutzim was no longer necessary. At the same time, the government realized
that the kibbutzim retained their defensive abilities and that the ideological
commitment of kibbutz members could be used to its advantage. In consequence,
many post-1948 kibbutzim were founded on the borders and in other sensitive
areas, where they could provide a firm military presence (Garber and Cohen,
1964). In the mid-1950s, the army established Nahal (Shokeid, 1971), a unit in
which recruits spent part of their army service working in kibbutzim. Nahal was
strongly supported by the kibbutz movement; it was seen as helping to prevent
army service from directing potential kibbutz recruits away from kibbutz settle-
ment (Garber and Cohen, 1964). Enthusiasm for Nahal was one consequence of
the shortage of recruits that developed in the kibbutzim in the 1950s.
With the increasing involvement of kibbutz members and former kibbutz
members in national politics and administration, the kibbutz federations became
more and more tied to their political party affiliations (Ben-David, 1964). This
trend intensified developments in the Mandate and precipitated a crisis within
the kibbutzim. At the time, the Israeli political left was in turmoil over anti-
Jewish policies in the USSR. Mapai condemned the Russian actions, and Mapam
continued to support the Soviet Union as a socialist state. At the kibbutz level,
this debate led to much argument and bitterness, and many kibbutzim split in
two (Stern, 1965; Viteles, 1967). As they did so, they became more firmly allied
to the political parties of their members' choice, allowing the parties to be more
confident in relying on those that were considered their kibbutzim for political
support (Arian, 1968). Views differ on the precise nature of the relationships
forged at this time; Stern (1965) argues that the kibbutzim were dominated by
the political parties and Kanovsky (1966) that the kibbutzim dominated them.
Certainly, close and persistent ties were established in the early 1950s; this
resulted in, among other things, the kibbutz federations levying a manpower tax
and taking 6 percent of kibbutz members to work in the federation (Kanovsky,
1966). Federation workers were effectively full-time party workers: a steady,
committed, and reliable source of political manpower (Arian, 1968). Further-
more, Davis (Blatt et al., 1975) estimates that the kibbutz movement supplied 20
percent of holders of high political office in Israel between 1948 and 1967. And
in the 1974-1977 Labor government, 4 of 18 cabinet members were also kib-
butz members (Weingrod and Gurevitch, 1977). Near (1986, p. 203) describes
them as a "serving elite," perhaps underplaying their power—as did the kibbutz
movement itself, preferring to be seen as a workers' movement, not a govern-
ing elite.
In his study of Israeli political behavior, Arian (1968) demonstrated that
pioneering Zionism was the predominant ideology of successive Labor govern-
ments until the 1970s. Undoubtedly, many Labor policies expressed kibbutz
ideals and benefited the kibbutzim particularly. The kibbutz movement's position
in the elite, here expressed in the implementation of movement ideology, was
clearly evident. The Likud bloc's 1977 election victory was described by many
Israeli newspapers as an "earthquake" (Peretz, 1977). It was a victory for an
ideology that was entirely opposed to the kibbutz movement. Herut, Begin's own
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party and the dominant force in the group, represented "revisionist Zionism"
(Sherman, 1982), the old antisocialist faction from the Yishuv whose ideas and
methods had seemed discredited. Likud's policies in government attacked the
kibbutz movement by, for example, shifting the focus of new settlement to the
West Bank, in pursuit of Greater Israel, a concept opposed by the kibbutz
movement. Economic strictures, such as cuts in subsidies, were also applied to
kibbutzim, reversing previous practice. And Likud's subsequent election cam-
paigns attempted to capitalize on some working-class town dwellers' idea of
kibbutz politicians as "privileged, patronizing representatives of the European-
origin establishment" (Sherman, 1982, p. 57).
Peretz (1977) attributes Likud's first victory, and Aronson and Yanai (1984) its
second in 1981, to a decline in the Israeli left-wing parties, associated with a
decline in their affiliated institutions, including the kibbutzim. They refer in
particular to the leadership: aging, retiring, representatives of a bygone era
(Peretz, 1977), who were preoccupied with internal squabbles (Aronson and
Yanai, 1984). For them, apparently, 1977 might prove a turning point for Israeli
national ideology and consequently a turning point for the kibbutz movement,
which would be driven willy-nilly from the national political scene into pre-
occupation with its own internal affairs. Events suggest that they are mistaken.
Despite its pursuit of many populist antikibbutz policies, Likud was weakened
by fundamental problems: the settlement program on the West Bank was con-
troversial and divisive, the war in Lebanon was disastrous, and Israel's economy
went from bad to worse, bringing hardship to the poor urbanites who had
supported Likud. The deadlock following the 1984 and 1988 elections and the
Peres-Shamir agreements to share power suggest that the Israel Labor Party is
far from dead.
For its part, the kibbutz movement was undoubtedly shaken by the 1977
"earthquake," but responded, as Sherman (1982) demonstrates, by renewed poli-
tical activism, attempting to confront the Likud attack. It seems that the "earth-
quake" may have revitalized the movement's role in national politics, not only at
government level, but also at the grass roots, by stimulating, for example,
involvement in nonkibbutz trade-union activities at the local level and in inter-
ethnic political dialogue (Sherman, 1982).
The significance of the kibbutzim in Israeli society after 1948 continued to rest
on their secure economic base. As the most modernized sector of Israeli agricul-
ture in the late 1940s and early 1950s, they were called upon to produce food for
the influx of immigrants (Stern, 1965) and therefore began to suffer from a
manpower shortage, soon to be exacerbated by the political upheavals of the
1950s. At the same time, Israel's borders with her neighbors were closed, trade
ended (Rokach, 1964c), and the new state tried to increase agricultural produc-
tion as quickly as possible. This policy proved particularly favorable to the
kibbutzim, whose inclination for mechanization and intensification of production
could be rapidly satisfied by government sponsorship of efficient agriculture.
Already more mechanized than other agricultural sectors in 1948, they main-
tained an advantage for several years (Kanovsky, 1966). The quota system,
aimed at controlling the nationwide overproduction that ensued in the late
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1950s, seems to have operated to the advantage of longer established and more
efficient producers, particularly the kibbutzim (cf. Abarbanel, 1972). By this time
the kibbutzim were abandoning production of unprofitable crops. For example,
vegetable production, with its low returns on high labor input, became a moshav
enterprise (Kanovsky, 1966). Generally, individual kibbutz economies became
less diversified (Garber and Cohen, 1964), departing from the principle of a
diversified economy that operated in the kibbutzim before 1948.
Unlike the moshavim, the kibbutzim could produce economic specialists whose
trained expertise in one branch of production allowed more rapid economic
advance (Shepher, 1972). The moshav farmers, with their small plots, were
inevitably generalists, especially in the early years. Job specialization helped the
effort to establish kibbutz industrial branches, which began in the early years of
the state (Don, 1977) and became particularly successful after the 1967 war
(Sherman, 1982). Industrial branches were stimulated by the general drive towards
economic advance (Cohen, 1966) and later on by the attempts of the kibbutz
movement to counteract any drift to the cities and industrial employment.
Although remarkably successful after 1948, the kibbutzim did encounter a
number of problems. Labor shortages were only partly solved by the abandon-
ment of labor intensive crops and by increasing mechanization and efficiency of
production. The development of industrial branches exacerbated the shortage,
and kibbutzim with such branches soon took on large numbers of hired laborers
(Stern, 1965). The occupation of the West Bank in 1967 provided kibbutz
industry with an important source of hired labor (Sherman, 1982). The lack of
sources for recruitment of members continued to worsen the labor problem. The
location of some kibbutzim meant that they were farming under difficult condi-
tions, on poor soil with little water (Garber and Cohen, 1964). Rokach (1964a)
notes that the new state was very slow to develop irrigation, inhibiting many
kibbutzim in their agricultural enterprises. The kibbutzim most affected by such
problems were the more recently founded ones (near the borders, in the Negev
desert, etc.), which also suffered the greatest labor shortages. The kibbutzim had
also faced a heavy burden of debt in the early 1950s. In an effort to expand and
develop their economies quickly in the later years of the Mandate, they had
taken out short-term, high-interest loans from private sources (Kanovsky, 1966).
These loans were gradually replaced by long-term low-interest loans allocated by
the Settlement Department, and the debt problems of the kibbutzim were eased
over the 1950s and 1960s.
The first Likud government's attempts to eradicate the low-interest loan
arrangements—widely seen as unfair preferential treatment for communities that
did not need it—had little impact on the kibbutzim because by the 1970s, they
were economically secure. During the years of statehood, the movement had
increased its efficiency and profitability, raised the standard of living of its
members relative to that of other Israelis (Kanovsky, 1966; Shatil, 1966; Stern,
1965) and built for itself an economically secure position allowing prosperity
virtually independent of government policy and resources sufficient to free some
members to continue engaging in politics. The movement could therefore work
to maintain its position in the wider society.
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KIBBUTZ INFLUENCE
The very direct way in which the kibbutz movement influenced the state of Israel
can be demonstrated by investigating the developing process of national planning,
which for many years bore the stamp of the kibbutz movement's ideological and
practical involvement.
Before 1948, individual kibbutzim planned their own economic activities from
year to year (Drabkin, 1962), and there were no national or regional plans
(Rokach, 1964b, 1964c). Pioneering Zionism showed strong agricultural and
rural bias, due to the emphasis on manual labor and efforts to alter the shtetl
way of life (Diamond, 1957). Rural settlement attained political, ideological, and
financial priority; despite some attention to Jewish urban settlement, such as the
foundation of Tel Aviv in 1909, and despite the fact that the majority of Jewish
immigrants settled in urban areas, urban development proceeded in a haphazard
manner (Cohen, 1970; Troen, 1988). There were a few desultory attempts at
rationalizing urban settlement—for example, some urban kibbutzim and housing
cooperatives—but these had little effect in producing planned urban settlement.
Cohen (1970) argues that the problems of Israeli cities today—poverty, over-
crowding, and inter-ethnic tension—originated in the Mandate period when city
development was largely ignored.
In 1948, therefore, the Yishuv had little experience with the two kinds of
planning it was to need to cope with the massive influx of immigrants. Long-
term, large-scale economic planning had no precedent in the Yishuv, and settle-
ment planning had a strong ideological bias in favor of rural areas (cf. Lipton,
1968). The immediate challenges of 1948-1950 were to settle quickly the new
immigrants and increase the food supply. This was achieved by short-term
emergency measures, and long-term planning commenced only in the 1950s
(Rokach, 1964c; Troen, 1988).
Economic planning focused firmly on agriculture (Kanovsky, 1966), partly
because of the necessity of food production and partly because of the dominant
pioneering ideology. The first development plan for 1951-1954 proved unrealistic:
it grossly overestimated the number of new settlements, the available water
resources, and the development of irrigation. It proposed a rise in the proportion
of agricultural workers, aimed at autarky in all food products except grain and
meat, and planned to continue existing types of settlement, assuming increasing
productivity, as in the kibbutzim. Rokach (1964c) asserts that all these proposals
were made without examining their economic rationality: the number of agri-
cultural workers was too high, and autarky was simply too costly. He attributes
these failings to the lack of understanding by the settlement authorities of the
new types of immigrants and their potentialities, to the lack of skilled planners,
and to the ideology of agriculture developed in the Yishuv. His study therefore
shows some of the consequences for post-1948 planning of the dominance of the
kibbutz movement—of course, kibbutz veterans were heavily involved in the
administration of the new state.
A later plan produced in 1953, though it recognized the water problems and
considered the international balance of payments, was heavily criticized by
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Israeli and foreign experts for a lack of reality similar to the earlier one. Only in
1956 was a more satisfactory plan produced, but even this was not fully imple-
mented, owing again to problems with water resources, and this time to in-
sufficient investment. These false starts in economic planning can be largely
attributed, as Rokach (1964c) and Cohen (1970) suggest, to the ideological
factors already examined.
Pioneering Zionism was incorporated into settlement planning in the form of
the slogan "dispersal of population." The planners recognized the lack of prece-
dents for settlement planning in the Yishuv and turned to the past experiences of
urbanization in other countries (especially European countries) for a model. The
model they adopted was that of a "hierarchy of settlements" (Cohen, 1970), a
range of community sizes from the small village (seen as the "basic agricultural
cell," Cohen, 1970), to rural centers—which would provide services for local
villages—regional centers, district centers, and cities—which were to be national
centers. With very few exceptions, only the bottom and the top of the hierarchy
existed in the new state, and the planners set about establishing the middle-sized
towns. Their earliest attempts proved to be "foreign bodies" (Cohen, 1970) in
areas of already established settlements: the agricultural communities surrounding
them, the kibbutzim, and old-established moshavim resented their presence, and
though a few provided jobs for the new urbanites as the planners had intended,
many refused to do so on ideological grounds. Conditions in the new towns were
poor, life was monotonous, and many, people left out of sheer boredom. The
towns were accorded low status in the country as a whole: only new immigrants
with no choice would go and live in them (Berler, 1972; Cohen, 1970; Deshen,
1970). Not until the 1960s did small town life improve, when the agricultural bias
was relaxed, and towns were given specific economic tasks of their own, free of
the agricultural enterprises of the already established settlements that surrounded
them (Cohen, 1970; Deshen, 1970). These tasks included agroindustry and, later
on, mining. Troen (1988) emphasizes the radical recognition embodied in this
later settlement planning: Israel was, and would continue to be, a predominantly
urban society. Kibbutzim helped ensure that a planned, successfully functioning
urban society would be hard won.
The kibbutz movement's influence on planning was, as one would expect,
beneficial for the kibbutzim. Before 1948, some kibbutzim belonging to the same
federation and located near one another had taken part in limited cooperation.
Garber and Cohen (1964) give several examples of well-established kibbutzim
providing advice and labor assistance for smaller and struggling ones. When
national planning began, the kibbutz communities, as I have pointed out, tended
to remain aloof from developments, despite movement members' involvement in
the planning process at national level. Developing social isolation in the 1950s
however—particularly as new immigrants went to moshavism and towns—served
to persuade the kibbutzim that first, they should cooperate across federation
boundaries, and second, that they would have to take part in the regional
planning programs. Cooperation gave kibbutzim increased access to agricultural
machinery, allowed repair shops to be used on a regional basis, provided regional
processing plants for kibbutz products, and allowed the establishment and main-
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tenance of cultural centers. Garber and Cohen (1964) argue that involvement in
regional cooperation helped the kibbutzim to overcome their social isolation and
retain their visible, elite positions.
It also provided solutions to some internal problems. New kibbutzim in
particular were suffering labor shortages; cooperation with other kibbutzim
alleviated them. The new kibbutzim also benefited from access to farm machinery
and other services available in the regional centers. Some writers (Garber and
Cohen, 1964; Kanovsky, 1966; Stern, 1965) suggest that regional cooperation
also allowed the kibbutzim to solve, at least for a time, their problems over hired
labor. The regional processing plants and other industrial enterprises hired the
workers; the kibbutzim no longer had to face the ideological ambiguity of hired
workers on their own doorsteps.
ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCE
The influences of the kibbutz movement and the state have been mutual. The
kibbutz movement looked outwards into the Yishuv and the Israeli state and
sought ways of influencing their character. It also aimed to further its own
internal development and was able to take advantage of events to do so. The
results of these interactions can be traced to every aspect of kibbutz life today.
This does not mean that somehow kibbutzim are identical to all other sectors of
Israeli society. Over the years, the kibbutz movement has developed a distinctive
ideology, remains marked by ideological self-consciousness and self-examination,
and retains commitment to a communal life realized though a distinctive set of
institutions. Furthermore, the processes of interaction in any particular kibbutz
give it a distinctive character, affecting the workings of its institutions and the
expression of the ideological charter. Nevertheless, if every aspect of kibbutz life
today shows environmental influence of the kind dealt with in this article, then
the use of the kibbutz as a social scientific laboratory could be very misleading,
and the basis of comparative study problematic. The examples of environmental
influence on the internal character of a kibbutz that will now be discussed are
based on the findings of fieldwork I carried out in the mid-1970s on a left-wing
kibbutz I shall here call Goshen.
Kibbutz-environment interaction is particularly clearly demonstrated in the
economy (Bowes, 1984). In the mid-1970s, Goshen's economy showed all the
characteristics predictable from the historical account: its orientation toward
efficiency and progress meant it was trying to make money with a specialized,
trained workforce, commercially viable products, industrialization, and the use
of regional processing facilities run by the movement. Its problems too were
predictable: founded in the late 1940s, Goshen had suffered from the recruitment
problems experienced by the movement as a whole, and, therefore, its economic
efforts were hampered by underpopulation. Combined with the drive to have
large, efficient economic branches, this underpopulation led to particularly acute
labor shortages, resulting in protracted ideological debate as the community
tried to avoid hiring workers. An interesting example of this process (discussed
at length in Bowes, 1988) occurred when Goshen faced a crisis with its cotton
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crop. In early 1975, the plants were growing well, but so were the weeds, and
workers were needed to hoe the fields. Temporary volunteer workers from
abroad worked hard at the task, and there were several mobilizations of kibbutz
members; both these measures were ideologically acceptable. But even after these
measures were used, the crop was still threatened by the weeds. Members were
faced with a contradictory situation: they needed to save the crop, and yet
vehemently opposed hiring paid labor, which was the only means of doing so.
The situation was resolved by a meeting of the General Assembly (the governing
body of the community); those most against hiring stayed away, and those most
committed to economic success voted to hire workers the next day. A few days
later, when the emergency was over, another meeting, with the righteous parti-
cipation of the objectors, reaffirmed Goshen's commitment to unpaid labor.
Both economic efficiency and the unwillingness to hire labor had long been
kibbutz movement principles, which had evolved in interaction with the wider
Jewish society in Palestine and Israel. Loyalty to this principle meant a constant
internal debate and often complicated maneuvering for the community, as in the
case described. But there was no question of one principle being permanently
sacrificed to the other: ceasing to strive for economic success would threaten the
movement's strong position in the wider socioeconomic structure of Israel and
admitting to a permanent hired labor force would threaten the movement's
autonomy. As far as possible, Goshen pursued a strategy allowing both economic
success and kibbutz autonomy at this stage.
Within the structural parameters imposed by the position of kibbutzim in
Israeli society, the people in Goshen worked at consolidating their own positions
in the community, their aims (such as training and permanent jobs), dictated by
historical precedent, and their strategies, comprehensible through examination of
the interweaving of the details of social interaction in Goshen with the his-
torically dictated structure. Certainly, a distinctively kibbutz way of doing things
could be identified, but its rationale and workings were comprehensible only in
context; they were not experiments in controlled conditions.
The position of women in the kibbutz movement today is explicable through
examination of kibbutz-environment interaction (Bowes, 1978, 1986). Far from
demonstrating women's "biogrammar" (Tiger and Shepher, 1975), the collectively
domestic and subordinate role of women today results largely from a series of
compromises made by the movement in the interests of continuing influence and
involvement in the wider Israeli society. The early years of the kibbutz movement
showed attempts to challenge the old patriarchal relationships of Jewish com-
munities, and kibbutz women particularly tried to liberate themselves from
domestic chores and childcare. But the efforts of the predominantly male kibbutz
movement were directed at statehood and, later, at influencing government
policy, not at liberating kibbutz women. The ideology of manhood (Hazelton,
1977; Rein, 1980) associated with pioneering Zionism remained, practically
speaking, virtually unchallenged. After 1948, it was perpetuated and consolidated
as successive Labor governments (involving kibbutz movement members) made
concessions to religious political parties over matters relating to women's status
to help ensure that issues considered more important would go Labor's way. The
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laws had direct implications for kibbutz women, relating, for example, to working
conditions considered suitable for women and the regulation of marriages; in
both cases, the laws passed were detrimental to women's emancipation (Lahav,
1977). Furthermore, it soon became clear that changing women's roles was not
really a priority in the kibbutz movement. Women were gradually moved into
service occupations in the name of efficiency, so that they could be near their
children, a traditional notion that had never really been challenged. Women's
work and service work, both called unproductive, became synonymous, devaluing
women themselves. Cut out of "productive" economic branches where the "really
important" work was done, women lost touch with formal community power,
lacked the economic expertise of men, and became politically marginal. Women
on Goshen were concentrated in service work and in childcare. Their concerns
reflected the history that had shaped their roles: they expected to work in service
branches, even though they did not particularly enjoy doing so, and many of
them saw fulfillment in marriage and children. Indeed women's investment in
their children, to a degree out of keeping with movement ideology, can be
interpreted as a counter attack against the devaluing process (cf. Bowes, 1978,
1986). Recent changes in the childcare system on some kibbutzim (but not
Goshen), such as provision for children to spend the night with their parents
rather than in children's houses, can therefore be traced back to the kibbutz-
environment relationship.
In comparison with other Israeli Jewish women, kibbutz women are relatively
emancipated, particularly as they are not individually dependent on one man.
Goshen's women recognized this, and retained allegiance to the (albeit rather
one-sided) feminism of the old pioneering Zionist ideology. In their way, there-
fore, kibbutz women identified themselves with the elite, effectively supporting
the strategies of kibbutz politicians.
A further example of environmental influence on the kibbutz can be seen in
ritual (Bowes, 1982). Goshen, as a member of the Kibbutz Artzi, the most left-
wing of the kibbutz federations, was officially atheist. The annual ritual cycle
included a number of ceremonies whose celebration expressed what I have
elsewhere (Bowes, 1982) termed a "culture of unbelief." In principle, atheist
kibbutzim celebrated historical, agricultural, and national festivals, but no reli-
gious ones. Traditional Jewish festivals were divested of their religious content
and turned to the purpose of celebrating the kibbutz itself. On Goshen, people
showed considerable discomfort with the celebration of these altered traditional
festivals. Very often, events to mark them were chaotic, people were unwilling to
take part, they talked ostentatiously throughout the celebrations, they com-
plained that things were badly organized, the entertainment was boring, and so
on. Such behavior can be interpreted as a means of enhancing the challenge to
tradition that the modification of old festivals had set out to achieve. Mere
reinterpretation, it seems, was not enough to maintain atheism and, hence,
an important aspect of kibbutz autonomy, and the bastion against the out-
sider ideology had to be reinforced. Meanwhile, kibbutz politicians making
concessions to religious parties in government were strengthening the hold of
religion over all Israeli Jews. As this happened over the years of Goshen's
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development, the use of traditional festivals had changed somewhat. In the
early years of the state, straightforward opposition to, and ignorance of, tradi-
tion were the norm; but by the 1970s, a more complicated engagement with
tradition developed, involving far more elaborate details of meaning and symbolic
reinterpretation.
As the influence of religion in Israel has strengthened, the kibbutz culture of
unbelief has become more elaborate and more complicated for kibbutz members
to explain. For example, kibbutz members now undergo religious marriage:
there is no civil marriage in Israel. Members of Goshen explained that they had a
formal marriage because they wanted their children to be legitimate and, having
decided that, the marriage had to be a religious one. They held the ceremony
away from the kibbutz, however, and would celebrate at home later with a
thoroughly secular party. Non-Jewish recruits to Goshen were encouraged to
convert to Judaism—on the surface a paradoxical measure, but one which
ensured that they would learn about being Jewish and how to be Jewishly
anti-religious.
Further examples could be given, but these three should serve to emphasize
how far social life within the contemporary kibbutz is shaped by the relationship
between the kibbutz and the wider structure of which it forms a part.
CONCLUSION
During the Yishuv, the kibbutz movement became established as a dominant
force in Jewish society in Palestine. At the same time, the movement itself was
undergoing ideological and organizational consolidation, and its ability to do so
depended on the acceptance of the Yishuv environment. This is particularly
apparent when we note the reliance of the kibbutzim on the Zionist movement
for recruits and the strictness of the British Mandate rule over Palestine, which
encouraged the kibbutzim to participate in illegal immigration and the military
actions of the Jewish community. Furthermore, we find that the progressive
orientations and efficiency of kibbutz agriculture and the viability of the kibbutz
form of social organization won it favor from the J.N.F. and enabled the
movement to expand. The greatest success of the kibbutz movement, its ideo-
logical and political ascendancy, was therefore due partly to the circumstances in
which it found itself and partly to its own inherent properties. One of these
properties, responsiveness, was particularly crucial.
The foundation of the state in 1948 was quickly followed by radical changes in
the environment of the kibbutz movement, which responded to these changes in
two ways. On the one hand, the kibbutzim themselves became isolated, as the
moshav movement grew in importance and the sources of kibbutz recruits
lessened. Small new kibbutzim suffered additional problems due to their inability
to attract enough recruits to become established. On the other hand, members
and former members of the movement were heavily involved in the administra-
tion of the new state, and pioneering ideology retained its prominence.
In the discussion of economic and social planning, we were able to see the
extent of kibbutz influence on Israeli society particularly clearly, both in the
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early economic plans and the principles of settlement planning. Realization of
the problems of maintaining the kibbutz orientation and the subsequent revision
of the plans meant that the kibbutzim were obliged to modify their attitudes
towards other types of settlement and to become directly involved in the regional
development programs. Despite the apparent setbacks immediately after state-
hood, the kibbutzim, particularly the newer ones, were able to stabilize their
membership and continue their own economic progress.
The three examples of the kibbutz economy and the roles of women and of
ritual suggested some ways in which the internal character of the kibbutz is
profoundly influenced by the involvement of the movement in Israeli society.
I set out in this article to examine aspects of kibbutz movement's history and
organization that will, in my view, serve seriously to question many of the
comparative studies I reviewed at the beginning. The kibbutz simply cannot be
cut out of its context and used as a community per se for comparative purposes.
Nor can it be used to draw lessons for other societies, cooperative or otherwise,
as if it were a clean, tidy, social laboratory. The growth of the kibbutz movement
has depended to a very considerable degree upon the nature of the Yishuv and
the state of Israel; indeed, part of the success of the "experiment that did not
fail" is external to the communities themselves. In Utopian socialist terms, the
kibbutz movement appears to have succeeded in exercising considerable influence
on the wider society. The intimate relationship between the kibbutz and its
environment and its dependence on this environment for its success might be
taken to indicate that, as a communal way of life, the kibbutz cannot be repeated
anywhere else or compared with any other social organization. This would,
however, be an overreaction to the errors of the enthusiastic commentators
considered earlier and is, in any case, sociologically unproductive. A more
moderate response, and one more appropriate to comparative study, would be to
recognize the importance of the environment of the kibbutz; in other words, to
look beyond the analytical boundaries of a community based micro-study.
In examining the place of the kibbutz in the Yishuv and Israeli society, I
focused on a variety of social factors. It appeared that the kibbutz enjoyed
ideological and political success particularly, and that its defensive role was also
of great importance. For purposes of comparative study, this suggests the pro-
ductivity of holism, an argument for the adoption of an anthropological orienta-
tion, which allows study of all the facets of social life. It echoes, for example,
Apthorpe's (1970) stress on the importance of planners' looking beyond purely
economic factors when attempting to set up cooperatives as part of programs of
planned social change.
It is particularly evident in the case of the kibbutz movement that community-
environment interaction affected both community and environment. For the
comparative study of communes, this suggests two useful points, perhaps obvious,
but certainly forgotten in the material reviewed earlier. First, however hard
communards may try to make their way of life separate and different from life
around them, we must expect them to remain affected by it. Second, communes
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themselves must be expected to have an impact on the society around them, and
may eventually change it, even without the kind of direct intervention observed
in the kibbutz case.
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